‘Messy Democracy’: Democratic pedagogy and its discontents by Hudson-Miles, Richard & Broadey, Andrew
Article
‘Messy Democracy’: Democratic pedagogy and its 
discontents
Hudson-Miles, Richard and Broadey, Andrew
Available at http://clok.uclan.ac.uk/28340/
Hudson­Miles, Richard and Broadey, Andrew ORCID: 0000­0003­2916­0115 (2019) ‘Messy 
Democracy’: Democratic pedagogy and its discontents. Research in Education . ISSN 0034­5237   
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the work.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0034523719842296
For more information about UCLan’s research in this area go to 
http://www.uclan.ac.uk/researchgroups/ and search for <name of research Group>.
For information about Research generally at UCLan please go to 
http://www.uclan.ac.uk/research/ 
All outputs in CLoK are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, including
Copyright law.  Copyright, IPR and Moral Rights for the works on this site are retained 
by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Terms and conditions for use 
of this material are defined in the http://clok.uclan.ac.uk/policies/
CLoK
Central Lancashire online Knowledge
www.clok.uclan.ac.uk
1 
‘Messy Democracy’: Democratic Pedagogy and its 
Discontents 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. ‘CUNTHOUSE’. ‘Messy Democracy’, installation view. 
 
 
 
‘One can teach what one doesn’t know if the student is emancipated [...] To 
emancipate an ignorant person, one must be, and one need only be, emancipated 
oneself’ (Rancière 1991: 15). 
 
‘Democracy stirs, but the mess stirs alongside it’ (Rancière 2010: 47). 
 
 
Introduction 
“All the group was asked to talk about their experiences of art education and my 
experience is ... it was twenty years ago I did my BA and there was quite a strong 
feminist presence on the course. I’d voiced certain views at the meeting about 
women artists and representation […] but my views weren’t widely received by 
the group and there was almost a kind of anti-feminist position by the women, 
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which was quite shocking and at the end of the meeting I just felt so frustrated, 
and I thought this can’t be right” (Messy Democracy participant, 2018).  
 
This paper offers a critical case study of a recent residency by the artists’ 
collective @.ac (www.attackdotorg.com), resulting in the exhibition ‘Messy Democracy’ 
(Hanover Project, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, 9th April - 2nd May 2018) 
(fig. 1). Inspired by the art school’s radical past, this project sought to generate an 
interstitial (Mahony 2016) space of autonomous student dissent within the neoliberal art 
school. The resulting ‘occupation’ operated as a testing ground for the autodidact 
hypothesis of Jacques Rancière’s The Ignorant Schoolmaster (1991). Both residency and 
this supplementary reading foreground disagreement as a mode of participation: a critical 
strategy developed from Rancière’s idiosyncratic conceptualisation of ‘democracy’ in 
Disagreement (1999). This paper seeks to draw special attention to the ways the @.ac 
residency made visible what Rancière, in Dissensus (2010: 45-61), has called the 
‘democratic paradox’: the fundamental incompatibility between the democratic impulse 
and the pragmatic structures necessary for its management. It achieves this by 
spectacularising dissensus through a mode of relational art practice (Martin 2007; 
Bourriaud 2002 [1998]); a model which is consistent with the similarly spectacular 
character of Rancièrean politics.  
This politics has been defined as ‘theatocratic’ (Hallward 2006: 110; Davis 2010: 
74), due to the extent to which it stages or makes visible dissensual voices otherwise 
ignored, or even silenced, by the miscount at the heart of commonplace notions of 
community, society, and democracy (Rancière 1999: 6). For Rancière, such 
conceptualisations rely on normative assumptions which depend on the elision of 
difference or dissensus for their stability. When such conceptualisations are invoked to 
frame all differences and antagonisms in the illusory harmony of structural consensus, 
they function to repress politics proper in the manner of ideology. As Ellsworth (1989) 
demonstrates, pedagogy, even in its most critical mode, is not immune to such 
assumptions and, instead, frequently reproduces them. This is especially true of 
conceptions of the ‘student voice’, ‘inclusion’, and ‘empowerment’; conceptions which 
both critical pedagogy and neoliberal education employ, albeit towards very different 
ends. Quite possibly, as the replicable science of education, pedagogy depends on the 
logic of such normative assumptions for its own systematic reproduction and professional 
validation. If this is the case, then there is a doubly oppressive logic at the core of all 
pedagogies: firstly, this normative, classifying, taxonomic force which seeks to deny the 
problem of difference in favour of the programmatic pursuit of universalising ends, and 
secondly, an assumption which Rancière identifies as the basis of all educational method: 
the presumed inequality of intelligences between teacher and educator, reproduced in the 
scene of teaching itself (1991: 7). 
With this understanding, the apparently oxymoronic character of ‘democratic 
education’, repeatedly identified by Biesta (2006; 2008; 2011), cannot solely result from 
the undemocratic nature of the dominant-hegemonic economic system; the argument 
which most critical pedagogy wishes to make. Neither can it be solely a result of the 
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irreconcilable difference between democracy as idea and democracy as system of 
government (Derrida 1993; 1994; Rancière 1999; 2010). Though, as this essay will argue, 
neoliberalism has transformed the university beyond recognition, depoliticising and de-
democratising it in the process (Readings 1996; Brown 2015), the scandalous wrong of 
Rancière’s philosophy for progressive educators is that it might be this originary 
inequality between teacher and student that ultimately prevents education from becoming 
truly democratic. In contrast, Rancière’s Ignorant Schoolmaster (1991) employs the 
hypothesis of the universal equality of intelligences to see ‘what can be done under that 
supposition’ of equality (46).  
Similarly, the @.ac residency proceeds from an egalitarian presumption of the 
capacity of those presumed ignorant to self-educate, independent from stultifying 
instruction from ‘master-explicators’ (4-8). The project (described below) 
‘theatocratically’ stages the removal of pedagogical labour, theory and method as a form 
of dissensual politics against education and, paradoxically, in the name of education. 
Whilst our paper argues that education ‘for democracy’ is an impossibility, it certainly 
doesn’t preclude the possibility of democratic education, on the strict understanding that 
it must exist ‘beyond teaching’, with dissensus, disagreement, and difference as its 
irreducible conditions. In this regard, both @.ac exhibition and this paper test the 
theoretical hypotheses of Rancière through practice. In the same manner, they also 
contribute to ‘Critical Pedagogy’, and the emerging field of ‘Critical University Studies’ 
(McLaren 2002 [1989]; Washburn 2005; Bousquet 2008; Newfield 2008). Going further, 
following the most radical conclusion of Rancière’s Ignorant Schoolmaster, our work 
stakes pedagogical suicide for the possibility of democratic education. However, instead 
of outlining a programmatic model, the discussion below aims to reveal glimpses of a 
nascent pedagogic democracy, or ‘democratic education to come’, made politically 
visible through the absence of pedagogy. 
 
The Beyond of Teaching 
 
Our activity aimed to decouple the notion of democracy, particularly democratic 
education, from its automatic equation with extant western liberal democracies; we 
contend that this must be made visible within the institutional frame of the university 
itself as practice, and the model we looked to was the art school occupations at Hornsey, 
Brighton, Guildford, Croydon, Leeds, and elsewhere, during 1968 - The Hornsey Film 
(Holland 1970) was a key reference. We consider these occupations as democratically 
productive forms of practice, triggered, in part, by the romantic discourses of the art 
school (Atkinson and Baldwin 1967): reasons why we remain interested in the art school 
as site of contestation today. At the same time, the art school was also chosen as a site of 
hauntological commemoration. Following Benjamin (1999: 462), the ambition was to 
bring past and present together in a critical constellation, generating a dialectical image of 
art school dissensus, which could be wielded as a weapon against its current stagnation 
and capitulation to the economic. This mode of practice attempted to rupture presumed 
continuities between art education, past and present, producing an opportunity to envision 
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the ‘beyond’ of art education by remembering its historical contestations. Imagining this 
‘beyond’ requires an epistemic shift which Rancière would describe as a total 
‘redistribution of the sensible’ (2004: 43): a deconstruction that would invert or collapse 
institutional logics, hierarchies, and pedagogies, shifting questions of inclusion and 
participation onto demonstrations of the difference between ‘democracy’ and ‘consensus’ 
(Derrida 1994: 61-95; Rancière 2009: 95-122). 
The contemporary reference we identified with the 1968 occupations is Stefano 
Harney and Fred Moten’s notion of the ‘undercommons’ (2009). They claim that ‘the 
only possible relationship to the university today is a criminal one’ (Edu-Factory 
Collective 2009: 145) and that progressive educators can only strive to steal back the 
qualitative within the ‘undercommons’ of the quantifying logic of the economic. In this 
reading, to ‘teach’ is to be complicit with one’s own oppression and that of others. 
However, the ‘other side of teaching’ can provide a stage through which the systematic 
interpellation of democracy and/or politics by the university can be made visible. As 
Harney and Moten argue, 
  
‘What is that work and what is its social capacity for both reproducing the 
university and producing fugitivity? If one were to say teaching, one would be 
performing the work of the university. Teaching is merely a profession and an 
operation of what Jacques Derrida calls the onto-/auto encyclopedic circle of the 
Universitas. But it is useful to invoke this operation to glimpse the hole in the 
fence where labor enters, to glimpse its hiring hall, its night quarters. The 
university needs teaching labor, despite itself, or as itself, self-identical with and 
thereby erased by it. It is not teaching then that holds this social capacity, but 
something that produces the not visible other side of teaching, a thinking through 
the skin of teaching toward a collective orientation to the knowledge object as 
future project, and a commitment to what we want to call the prophetic 
organization’ (Harney and Moten in Edu-Factory 2009: 146). 
 
This ‘beyond of teaching’ (146) suggests the necessity of scandalous actions on 
the part of educators - the withdrawal of knowledge labour, the theft of qualitative time, 
the refusal of subjection, ‘the negligence of professionalization, and the 
professionalization of the critical academic’ (147) – to challenge the university’s 
recuperative maintenance of the prevailing order. Within this epistemic ‘police order’, 
which silences dissensus for consensus, Rancière (1999) contends that scandalous dissent  
will only be acknowledged when staged as visibly and dramatically as possible. Within 
his system, this spectacularisation of ‘dissensus’ (2010), or the egalitarian claim of ‘the 
part that has no part’ (1999: 65), constitutes ‘politics’ (21-42); a form of ideological and 
democratic struggle so dependent on dramatisation that Hallward (2006) has 
characterised it as ‘theatocracy’.  
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The @.ac residency at UCLan tested the capacity of ‘theatocracy’ to initiate 
Moten and Harney’s call for scandalous action. It dramatised the aporetic ‘beyond of 
teaching’ by staging the total removal of knowledge-labour. Our anticipation was that this 
spectacle of non-teaching would highlight the paradox of ‘universal education’ (Rancière 
1991: 16); namely, that everybody has the capacity to learn without without a ‘master 
explicator’, yet ‘no one wants to cope with the intellectual revolution [this] signifies’ 
(16). Furthermore, we insist on this ‘beyond of teaching’ as a pedagogic and political end 
in itself, not a means towards the ends of democratic education, sociability, or politics, let 
alone neoliberal educational ends such as ‘employability’, ‘entrepreneurship’, or 
‘excellence’ (Readings 1996: 21-43). Finally, we argue that art education is uniquely 
situated for constructing ‘theatocratic’ politics, not just simply because of Rancière’s 
repeated turn to examples from the theatre, alongside literature and the visual arts, as 
metaphors for the constructed stage of democracy (2011b; 2012: 1-40). Recent critical 
debates around social engagement and inclusion in art practice (Martin 2007; Beech 
2008) have drawn attention to how the ‘buzzword’ of participation frequently promises 
more than participatory art can politically deliver. Rather than lament the paucity of such 
projects, or simply attack the structural violence of the strategic imposition of political 
narratives on all participants regardless, we suggest that the structural contradictions and 
shortcomings of such works are in fact necessary consequences of democracy. Following 
Rancière’s work on the aesthetics of politics (2004; 2009; 2010), we suggest that it is 
only in the staging of democracy that its irreducibly dissensual elements, which make 
consensus democracy an illusion of ideology, can be made visible in their maddening 
political heterogeneity. We believe that staging the prevailing ‘distribution of the 
sensible’ and its possible ‘redistribution’ is a necessary consequence of political art 
projects and politicised art education. 
Nonetheless, we are aware that what follows then, by necessity, may appear as a 
purely negative attempt at destroying prevailing pedagogic method, or even a meditation 
on the impossibility of pedagogy per se. It certainly offers little in the way of a 
pedagogical toolkit for progressive educators. The project’s shortcomings, missteps, and 
inadequacies, which include internal resistance by its various actors, reveal as much 
about the difficulties involved in pursuing democracy as educational ideal as educational 
method. In the final analysis, the revelation and subsequent recognition of these 
insurmountable difficulties is the project’s educational method. 
 
Democracy and Education 
 
Our project responds specifically to the Rancièrean reading of democracy, taken 
from Disagreement (2009) and, to a lesser extent, Dissensus (2010: 45-61). Part of this 
task involves demonstrating how the democratic political impulse is enabled or 
recuperated within the pedagogic scene. This dialectic of ‘politics’, as the paradoxical 
claim of the ‘part that have no part’ (2009: 65) within the social order, and ‘police’, as the 
systematic, structural, or ideological silencing of that egalitarian claim, is the central 
dynamic of Rancière’s philosophical system (Hallward 2006: 110; Davis 2010: 74). 
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Needless to say, this animates his theory of education as much as his work on art, 
literature, and aesthetics, which could be characterised as articulating a political idea of 
‘subjectification’ (2009: 35-42), against the policed ‘stultification’ (1991: 12-18) by 
social, cultural, or institutional authorities. This dynamic, which is always already 
pedagogic, underpins his disavowal of Althusserianism in Althusser’s Lesson (2011b), his 
celebration of the extracurricular activities of the nineteenth century worker-poets in 
Proletarian Nights (2014), and his revelation of the generally contemptuous attitude of 
the political philosopher to the masses in The Philosopher and His Poor (2003). 
However, the Rancièrean theory of democratic education, or education as democratic 
politics, is most famously and directly articulated in The Ignorant Schoolmaster (1991). 
As suggested above, our project could be fairly characterised as a live experiment testing 
the central autodidact hypothesis of that volume. 
A variety of critical theories of education have, of course, informed our general 
approach, but, as Gur Ze’ev (2010: 1) reminds us, it is almost impossible to speak of a 
singular ‘Critical Pedagogy’ today, given the diversity of the field and the incompatibility 
of the various divergent ‘Critical Pedagogies’. We give, for instance, critical support to 
the project initiated by John Dewey with Democracy and Education (2005 [1919]), and 
similar support, also, to recent work from the United States, including Aronowitz (2008), 
Giroux (1983), Greene (1988), and McLaren (1989), which from the 90s onwards 
constitute ‘Critical Pedagogy’ as a canon. Our work does not attempt to ‘decolonise’ 
(Bidisha 2015) the art school, though we do not disregard the work of Paulo Freire 
(1970), bell hooks (1994), and others who write back to the attendant pedagogies of 
Empire. However, we would caution against the uncritical and general application of 
such theories to our particular context. As Rancière asserts, whoever ‘teaches without 
emancipation stultifies’ (1991: 81), but there is a danger with a universalising 
pedagogical identification with the pedagogic rhetoric of hooks, Freire, et al, which, 
outside of the specificities of their cultural struggle, can lead to the misguided assumption 
that all education, regardless of class, gender, or racial contexts, proceeds from a shared 
goal of ‘freedom’ or ‘emancipation’. Elizabeth Ellsworth’s essay ‘Why Doesn’t This Feel 
Empowering?’ (1989) speaks to the consequences of such an approach: she reports on a 
class called ‘Media and Anti-racist Pedagogies’ delivered at the University of Wisconsin-
Madison, 1988, which set out to empower marginalised, minority voices, but ended up 
exacerbating ‘the very conditions [they] were trying to work against, including 
Eurocentrism, racism, sexism, classism, and “banking education” (Ellsworth 1989: 298). 
As Ellsworth demonstrates, these were direct consequences of a general curriculum of 
‘liberatory pedagogy’, the abstract language of which silenced the socio-cultural 
specificities of individual oppression (299).  
Like Ellsworth, Gur Ze’ev (2010) has drawn attention to the redundancy of such 
universals, particularly as educational ideals, in the face of what Boltanski and Chiapello 
(2005 [1999]) called the ‘New Spirit of Capitalism’. For Gur Ze’ev, the heterogeneous 
forces of globalised neoliberal capitalism have transformed geopolitical relations and 
identities, deconstructing ‘the pre-conditions for transcendence (and therefore also for 
edifying “critique”)’ (2010: 10). In the face of this, the old lexicons of educational 
emancipation begin to resemble the worst form of bourgeois humanist ideology. More 
problematically, as the Ellsworth paper demonstrates, the elision of difference within the 
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rhetoric of emancipation can accidently reproduce a reactionary ‘surrendering of the 
victims to their victimization processes’ (Gur Ze’ev 2010: 10). Ellsworth’s solution, 
which has been influential to our approach, is to embrace a ‘pedagogy of the 
unknowable’ (1989: 318-24). 
Given the above, our project proceeded from the critique of neoliberalism, 
implied as necessary by Gur Ze’ev. This involved not only a recognition of the specific 
and divergent subjectivities interpellated by neoliberal monoculturalism, but also the 
extent to which neoliberal logics are internalised within the university. One of the most 
trenchant recent critiques of the wholescale effects of neoliberalism is Wendy Brown’s 
(2015) Undoing the Demos, which includes numerous references to the academy (22-4; 
175-200). Brown’s thesis argues that neoliberalism ‘economises’ (17) cultural practices, 
institutions, politics, and behaviours, on an individual and national level, to such a degree 
that their political character disappears within the economic. In effect, neoliberalism 
substitutes homo politicus with homo oeconomicus (31) - both state and individual model 
their aspirations on the corporate ambitions and strategy of the modern firm, such as 
‘economic growth, competitive positioning, and brand enhancement’ rather than 
democratic ideals such as ‘equality, liberty [and] inclusion’ (26-7). This neoliberal 
transformation of the university had already been recognised by the writers working 
under the nom de guerre Edu-Factory Collective (2009; 2011). Jeffrey Williams 
demonstrates that the fees structure of American universities has created a ‘pedagogy of 
debt’ (Edu-Factory Collective 2009: 89-96) underpinning all university degrees; Jason 
Read sees the possibility of the university as a pedagogic commons increasingly 
restricted due to neoliberal enclosures (151-3); Newfield argues that the crisis of the US 
university is a direct result of ‘the conservative attacks on the democratization of society 
that the post-World War II university - especially the public university - was spreading in 
American society’ (179). 
Even before the work of the Edu-Factory Collective, Readings (1996) claimed the 
neoliberal university was ‘in ruins’, bereft of any tangible cultural mission, governed by 
the empty managerial rhetoric of ‘excellence’ (21-43) rather than Humboldtian ideals of 
cultural advancement or ‘bildung’ (62-9). Similarly, writing to the UK context, 
McGettigan (2011) argues that recent neoliberal reforms to higher education, by 
accelerating its ‘commodification’, ‘marketisation’ and ‘financialisation’ (McGettigan 
2013: 25; 64-5) have transformed the sector beyond recognition. Once conceived as a 
public good, worthy of public funding, higher education is now conceived as a human 
capital investment in oneself, necessarily financed individually (McGettigan 2013). 
Acutely aware of the financial consequences of failure, increasingly more students 
‘invest’ in potentially more lucrative STEM subjects than the arts and humanities (Adams 
2017). The ‘Browne Review’ (2010) promised to democratise the sector but, in many 
ways, had the opposite effect. The trebling of tuition fees, currently £9,275 p.a., has had a 
disproportionate effect on part-time students (Horrock 2018) and mature students 
(Coughlan 2018), whose hitherto unseen barriers to HE access, many of them fiscal, are 
slowly being made apparent.  
This dismal democratisation through financialisation has not only made the 
university less democratic, but entrenched its function as Althusserian ISA (1971: 145-7): 
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the ‘pedagogy of debt’ not only shackles students to neoliberalism via an unpayable 
personal debt mountain (Williams in Edu-Factory Collective, 2009: 95) but also teaches a 
particular worldview. In this ideology, there is no thing as society, nothing in life comes 
for free, freedom comes through consumption, and no other world is possible other than 
the neoliberal consensus (95-6). On the other side of the coin, the marketisation of the 
sector, triggered by the removal of the institutional student number cap, has mutated HE 
from a consensual parliamentary democracy into a vicious Hobbesian ‘war of all against 
all’. As part of this, metric-driven league tables such as the REF, TEF, and now KEF, 
promise democracy by enabling informed student choice. The real consequences of this is 
an audit culture which pits managers against staff, students against teachers, and 
institution against institution; the educational version of what Rancière would 
characterise as a ‘society of contempt’ (1991: 75-100). In the face of this dysfunctional 
neoliberal consensus, Derrida (1994: xviii) famously asks “Whither Marxism?”; 
Readings (1998) might ask “Whither bildung?” Our question, inseparable from both of 
these, is simply “Whither education?”, let alone art education, dissensus, or democracy, 
within this equation. 
To address this question, one must address the homonymy surrounding questions 
of democracy, acknowledged by Biesta (2006), Brown (2015: 18-21), Rancière (2009: 
83-93), and most others who tackle the subject. This homonymy precedes questions of 
democratic education; embodying the différend (Lyotard 1988) at the heart of discussions 
of democracy per se. The ideological vacuum, post-communism, has entrenched 
neoliberal consensus (Derrida 1994: 61-95; Charlesworth 2002; Rancière 2009: 95-122; 
Brown 2015: 17-45) conflating the homonyms ‘democracy’ and ‘neoliberal democracy’ 
into synonyms. Rancière has famously characterised this as the ‘consensus system’ 
(2009: 95). To move beyond this, Rancière and Brown suggest resisting a contained 
definition in favour of an insistence on the political character of democracy as self-rule 
(20). Similarly, Biesta challenges the presumed function of ‘democratic education’ to be 
primarily the education of democratic citizens (2006). For expedience, we simply 
reiterate that the triumph of liberal democracy has not made the neoliberal university 
noticeably more democratic, and limit our discussion of the important and directly 
relevant work of Biesta (2006; 2008; 2011; 2013; 2017) to the following comments. 
Firstly, we share Biesta’s (1998: 30) concern to highlight the ‘impossibility’ of 
education; doubts which throw the project of all pedagogies, even critical ones, into 
question. Biesta (2006) has suggested the democratic education has the ‘double duty’ for 
‘the creation of worldly spaces and their undoing’. He hinges this thesis on the Derridean 
notion of ‘democracy-to-come’ (Derrida 1994: 81-2; 212-3) which equates the possibility 
of democracy with an infinite openness to the ‘radical otherness of the other’ (Derrida 
1997: 14). For Derrida, the demand to be recognised and included as you are, without 
reduction to a normative schema, is both a demand for justice and an impossibility within 
the current conjuncture. Manifest as relationality, justice implies an approach to the 
unknown; hence, what it might mean to address the other justly eludes determination. In 
contrast to such undecidability, normative schema offered an illusory and comforting 
clarity: 
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‘When the path is clear and given, when a certain knowledge opens up the way in 
advance, the decision is already made, it might as well be said that there is none to 
make, irresponsibly and in good conscience, one simply applies or implements a 
program’ (Derrida 1992: 41).  
 
For Biesta, the problem with ‘committed’ critical pedagogies is that they operate 
according to such a normative model. This approach is typified for him by the work of 
McLaren (Biesta 1998: 205-6), though the charge could be levelled at many others within 
the field. When critical pedagogy calls for emancipation through an understanding of our 
situation, it always tends to elide the specificity and heterogeneity of situated knowledge 
within the construction of revolutionary and broadly applicable collective programme. In 
this regard, though critical pedagogy speaks truth to power, it tends towards a blindness 
towards its own contamination ‘by the operations of power’ (206). At the heart of this 
blindness is a ‘positive utopianism’ (Gur Ze’ev 1998: 463; Biesta 1998: 501-2) which 
uncritically assumes the knowledge of the oppressed to be superior to that of the 
oppressor. Biesta thus identifies a double bind in critical pedagogy - to emancipate, it 
champions situated knowledge; by championing situated knowledge, it reproduces 
oppression in new forms. Acknowledging this double-bind is to proceed, like The 
Ignorant Schoolmaster (Rancière 1991), without clear knowledge of any specific future – 
an ignorance into which a future may possibly be disclosed (Biesta 1998). 
In contrast to Derrida’s notion of ‘democracy-to-come’ (Derrida 1994), our 
project ‘Messy Democracy’ engages with a Rancierian model of ‘democratic paradox’ 
(Ranciere 2008). In Dissensus (2010) Rancière argues that moments of dissensus can 
articulate a paradox at the core of democracy making the ‘otherness of the other’, 
endlessly deferred within Derrida’s reading, visible as a manifestation of heterology 
within social relations. Rancière argues that this paradoxical relation is manifest as the 
discontinuity between ‘democracy as a form of government [and] democracy as a form of 
social and political life and so the former must repress the latter’ (2010: 47). Put another 
way, the proper name of ‘Democracy’ can be invoked to support any governmental 
action, including the suppression of the democratic impulses of the demos through anti-
democratic exemption. Yet, as Ranciere notes, democracy is always already the ‘politics’ 
that subverts all governments; the ‘supplementary, or grounding, power that at once 
legitimises and de-legitimises every set of institutions or the power of any one set of 
people (2010: 52). Derrida has referred to this peculiarly destructive or implosive quality 
as democracy’s ‘auto-immunity’ (Derrida 1993; 1994: 177), the circularity of which can 
only be broken through receptivity to the other, or the ‘democracy-to-come’. Rancière’s 
counter to both Derrida, and by implication Biesta, is that  
 
‘democracy is this principle of otherness. Rather than a power of self, democracy 
is the disruption of such a power and of the circularity of the arkhè. It is an 
anarchic principle that must be presupposed for politics to exist at all and insofar 
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as it is anarchic it precludes the self-grounding of politics, establishing it instead 
as a seat of division’ (Rancière 2010: 53).  
 
Following this, we argue for an impossible pedagogy based on the dissensual and 
permanent articulation of the ‘part that has no part’ against all systems of governance, 
even those which profess to be emancipatory. Figured thus, democratic education is 
neither utopian nor deferred, but immanent to ‘politics’ itself, and democracy is a 
dissensual structure of co-existent and contradictory heterogeneities working constantly 
against dominant-hegemonic ideology or, as Rancière, would phrase it, ‘the distribution 
of the sensible’ (2004: 12; 2009: 57-60, 124-5). 
 
The ‘theatocratic’ model we have outlined takes form when democratic paradox 
spectacularises an energetic discontinuity between forms of governance and individual 
politics. Davis (2010: 74) has identified that Rancièrean politics is manifested in three 
distinct phases: first, ‘an argumentative demonstration’; second, ‘a theatrical 
dramatisation’; and finally, ‘a ‘heterologic disidentification’, demonstrating the 
democratic paradox of our ‘being together to the extent we are in between - between 
names, identities, cultures, and so on’ (Rancière in Davis 2010: 84). In practice, as our 
case study attests, these parameters fragment and intersect in a complex and uneven 
dynamic. In contrast to Davis’s processual model, our exhibition indicated that 
argumentation, dramatisation, and disidentification intersect within and between the 
various dimensions of the ‘theatocratic’ event. Through these intersections the politics of 
aesthetics (primarily embodied through disidentification) and aesthetics of politics 
(primarily embodied through argumentation) mutually disrupt each other.  
 
The ‘theatocratic’ event can be art when these dynamic components constitute a 
sensuous manifestation of a concept in contestation - in the case of our project the 
concept is democratic education. This model is consistent with Rancière’s insistence 
upon a dissensual relation between art’s resistance to conceptual appropriation and its 
political context - the way it resists power. ‘The problem is […] to maintain the very 
tension by which a politics of art and a poetics of politics tend towards each other, but 
cannot meet up without suppressing themselves.’ (Rancière 2010: 183) One response to 
these correlated moments of resistance is to call for a synthesis of aesthetics and politics 
in the art form, to bring forth an event capable of transforming the distribution of the 
sensible (Fynsk 2017: 65). Such a claim requires fusing the experience artworks embody 
with a material form ‘to extract a bloc of sensations’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 167) 
conflating sensuous resistance and political resistance in the form of a becoming. The 
problem Rancière identifies here is the emphatic nature of such work, which he considers 
can cancel ambiguity, and risk entering social relations as political dogma. In contrast, 
the ‘theatocratic’ event advances tension between non-cognitive or aesthetic and 
determinate political dimensions. Affects trigger responses and responses produce 
effects; energetic discontinuity mobilised in a social field is the form of the work. Hal 
Foster might call such a work ‘post-critical’ as part of his call for art that de-fetishizes 
(Foster 2015: 122, 124). We emphasise that the case for critical art practice is no different 
to critical pedagogy and re-iterate Ellsworth’s commentary – for whom, in what context, 
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and with what assumptions? The ‘theatocratic’ model advances all vectors of dissensus 
and is a multiplication of critique that acknowledges the right of all actors to contribute.  
 
 
Messy Democracy 
 
As suggested above, the @.ac exhibition ‘Messy Democracy’ sought to stage a 
‘theatocratic’ event within the neoliberal art school; an ‘occupation’ of its institutional 
frame by its student-consumers. The aims of this intervention were threefold. Firstly, to 
make visible a plurality of dissensual student voices as politics against the incorporated 
‘student voice’ of the neoliberal university’s consumer satisfaction surveys and marketing 
messages. Secondly, to draw attention to the intellectual and pedagogic labour of the 
academic precariat through its spectacular and political withdrawal. Thirdly, in lieu of the 
withdrawn labour of the ‘master-explicators’, this intervention became a test of the 
central hypothesis of Rancière’s The Ignorant Schoolmaster (1991); an experiment which 
would hopefully begin to suggest the ‘beyond of teaching’ alluded to above. 
 Spectators and participants were invited to engage with this experiment in the 
manner of a conventional exhibition. This exhibition operated as a ‘theatocratic’ stage 
where the contradictions, power relations, and politics of the neoliberal art school were 
made visible in dissensus. It was envisaged in three stages, broadly following the 
sequence of Rancièrean politics outlined above. However, the deliberately anarchic 
character resisted such sequential and structural order. Indeed, to attempt to impose an 
interpretive order to this project post-hoc would be to enact the worst kind of police order 
violence on the nascent politics which emerged. The following short discussion is 
arranged into sequential stages for methodological illustration only; to do justice to the 
political plurality which emerged form, and ultimately overturned, that structure would 
need significantly more attention possible within this short paper, if it is possible to speak 
for dissensual politics at all.  
The ‘argumentative demonstration’ was initiated by @.ac through a meeting with 
eighteen students from BA Fine Art, MA Fine Art and MA Photography on the 12th 
February, following an open invitation to collaborate sent cross-faculty. During this 
meeting participants decided upon the formation of a steering committee that would 
function as mediator between @.ac and students. The imposition of a bureaucratic 
structure on the project felt like a strategic compromise from the outset, though it was 
difficult to imagine how dissensus could be facilitated otherwise. As with the imagined 
socialist utopias, it was expected that this quasi-state would gradually wither away, and 
that the ‘occupation’ would follow an anarchic path of its own. Unsurprisingly, the 
establishment of Rancièrean pedagogy was difficult without recourse to existing 
operational structures and pedagogico-managerial modes. Indeed, this became one of the 
more interesting discoveries of the project. Initiating the project drew @.ac into 
techniques, such as didactic ‘briefings’, which perpetuated the hierarchical tutor / student 
dynamic. Attempts at facilitating radical inclusion, such as open calls, university wide 
planning meetings, and workshops, generated enthusiasm, albeit in small numbers. 
Sessions included powerful contributions from genuinely marginalised voices, but the 
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heterogeneity of these dissensual voices also created a destabilising and ultimately 
debilitating stasis. As disagreement heightened, withdrawal from the dissensual 
‘theatocratic’ model began to appear for many as a more viable way of ‘working 
together’. A ‘consensus model’ took hold, setting-up a value structure consistent with 
both reactionary liberal and misguided critical pedagogy. Undeniably, the majority of 
faculty did not respond to the call to participate, bathetically invalidating the project’s 
aspirations for ‘radical inclusion’. The relationship between low participation and a 
broader wider student apathy with the HE status quo is a factor here. Yet this is a familiar 
problem with participatory art projects and indeed participatory education – to force 
inclusion for democratic ends is auto-immunitary, but without widescale participation 
how can any project claim to be representative? Ultimately, non-participation is a form of 
democratic dissensus and must at least be recognized as such.  
Another general issue within such projects is their tendency to impose pre-
established parameters which deny participants the option to contribute parameters of 
their own (Bishop 2012: 1). Dave Beech claims that ‘to participate in an art event […] is 
to enter into a pre-established social environment that casts the participant in a very 
specific role’ (2008: 3). Rather than this ‘consensus model’, prioritising agreement 
through the fixity of roles, a Rancièrean model of democratic education would gauge its 
viability through disagreement, decentralising all roles, identities, and aims. Some of the 
initial staged group activities succeeded in bringing these antagonisms to the fore. An 
activity involving participants writing down and discussing their perceptions of the 
problems with HE on a sheet of paper covering the floor (fig. 2.) produced genuine, if 
unproductive, dissensus. Complaints about gender inequality by some students were 
attacked by others as an attempt to hijack the space in the name of feminism and identity 
politics. Similarly, when one student disclosed her autism she felt others framed it 
incorrectly as a disability. In a subsequent session, the question of how to accommodate 
themes as diverse as class politics, university fees, and gender inequality within an 
exhibition exacerbated these antagonisms. Strategic planning was often coloured by 
implicit, and at times explicit, dissent. For example, one student directly attacked the 
whole purpose of the exhibition, as well as the competency of his tutors and peers to 
resolve the exhibition to the standards that he considered professional, before 
dramatically announcing his withdrawal from the process. These dissensual antagonisms 
paved the way for the students to retreat into their own ‘consensus model’ mediated by 
the steering committee. The logic of the status quo, as this activity proved, is 
incompatible with ‘openness to the otherness of the other’, which in its radical alterity is 
generally perceived as antagonism and met by a ‘police order’ repressive response. 
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Fig. 2. Facilitated workshop during the planning stages of Messy Democracy 
 
Overall, the month-long project demonstrated the three-part structure of 
Rancièrean politics in a chaotic and intermittent manner, though its various aspects 
broadly align with different components of the ‘theatocratic’ event. The ‘theatrical 
dramatisation’ of this dissensus consisted in the cladding of Hanover Project’s white 
walls in chipboard, allowing students to work directly on the walls. This material 
transformation was designed to emphasise the desired shift from transformation from 
passive consumption to active production. It also immediately made visible both the 
student ‘occupation’ and a variety of divergent identity politics. The dramatisation of the 
gallery as a ‘free’ space of educational exchange - accentuated by the removal of all 
professional educators and the recasting of ‘students’ and ‘educators’ as co-producers - 
constituted an auto-critique of the ‘stultification’ of art and art education (Rancière 1991: 
13) in its institutional, commodified setting. As such, the mise-en-scène of the 
transformed gallery made visible the scandalous undercommons within the university, 
demonstrating the dependency of the neoliberal university on exploited knowledge-labour 
for its reproduction, and the capacity of students to self-organise their learning, 
independent of, and as equals to, their ‘master-explicators’. The creative actions of 
participants aestheticised individual identity politics; moments of spectacular 
disidentification set apart from the everyday of educational practices. Subtly, these 
instances of ‘emancipated spectatorship’ (Rancière 2009b) bleed into the wider structures 
of the university as political questions. Such questions produce what Mahoney calls 
‘interstitial distance’ (Mahony 2016; Critchley 2007). Speaking of recent student protests 
and occupations, Mahoney argues that these political actions open internal spaces within 
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institutions where power relations can be assessed, yet operate at a critical distance from 
them. In Critchley’s words, such politics operates ‘within the state against the state in a 
political articulation that attempts to open a space of opposition’ (Critchley 2007: 114). 
‘Messy Democracy’ dramatised an interstitial politics, ‘performing or playing, in the 
theatrical sense of the word, the gap between a place where the demos exists and a place 
where it does not’ (Rancière 1999: 88).  
This dramatised art school undercommons also generated, and gave a platform to, 
self-organised collective dissensus. A feminist collective was formed in responses to the 
@.ac call, who subsequently staged a group action entitled ‘CUNTHOUSE’ (fig. 3); a 
reference to Judy Chicago and Miriam Schapiro’s 1972 exhibition ‘Womanhouse’. This 
collective action directly resulted from disagreements within the planning process. MA 
Fine Art student Emma Willis stated, “Discussions have drawn a diverse range of issues 
to the attention of the students. One of the issues that stood out [was how] in what is still 
a very patriarchal system, there seems to be a lack of feminist knowledge”. To 
compensate for this lack, ‘CUNTHOUSE’ screamed feminist dissensus into the vacuum 
of the patriarchal art school. 
 
Fig. 3. Planning ‘CUNTHOUSE’. 
 
Finally, ‘heterologic disidentification’ (the irreducible otherness at the core of 
democracy) was made visible in the friction between student as consumer of the 
university and student as producer. Equally, in the gambit of independent learner and 
absent teacher, whose co-dependence was made manifest, cognisable, and thus resistible, 
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in every act of creative transgression. Finally, this was manifest in the unmanageable 
political heterogeneity produced by the project. Disagreements were mediated by the 
steering committee; effectively a ‘policing’ mechanism for the chaos of dissensus. To  
proceed at all, a compromise structure for the exhibition was implemented which gave 
each actor their own personal platform. Though the students agreed to frame this as a 
communal rolling programme of actions, inescapably these were also individuated 
demonstrations, existing in a fragile political and aesthetic truce with each other. Within 
the gallery, each contributor participated by adding to, co-existing with, and where 
necessary, rearranging existing installations. Therefore, the exhibition indicated 
methodological possibilities for democratic education within a contradictory relation of 
governance and demos in ways that are consistent with Rancière’s notion of ‘democratic 
paradox’. Whilst the open call atomised and individualised creative labour in a 
conventional exhibition mode, it allowed different articulations of practice to conmingle. 
The clutter of some people’s production disrupted the display of other artworks. After 
initially consenting to work separately, participants often arrived at informal co-working 
arrangements in the gallery. For example, the gallery became an informal crèche 
seemingly without prior planning. The additive nature of the exhibition facilitated the 
artistic disruption of the ‘consensus model’ from which in turn attempted to enclose 
dissensus. These individual acts of dissensus, jarring with the imposed consensus of the 
exhibition structure, demonstrate the problematic of democratic education, and its auto-
immunitary tendency to self-destruct. 
Yet, these theatrical and heterologic moments produce alternate trajectories of 
thought and action; a community of dissensus comprised of subjective becomings and the 
‘equality of intelligences’. This contrasts with the pedagogy of the contemporary 
university, grounded in the authority of the lecturer who constantly reinstates distance 
between the students and themselves, reducing teaching to ‘stultification’ and 
‘performance’ to grade bands. An education grounded in ‘theatocracy’ is a learning based 
in disrupted norms. This is different to Biesta’s call for ‘an ignorance that makes room 
for a disclosure’ (Biesta 1998: 505). ‘Theatocratic’ disruption produces a spectacle of 
otherness that invokes heterology within its process. By transgressing modes of 
governance, the demos achieves the capacity to learn. Thus, the ‘democratic paradox’ 
(Rancière 2010) and ‘the ignorant one’s lesson’ (Rancière 1991: 19-45) are realised 
‘theatocratically’. 
We draw two related conclusions from the project. Firstly, components of the 
‘theatocratic’ event intersect within dissensual mobile arrangements making it senseless 
to identify the ‘theatocratic’ model as a staged or phased process. Each component relates 
to the others in a relation of reciprocal presupposition, so each moment of dramatization, 
disidentification, and argumentation depends on the mobilising force of other 
‘theatocratic’ components. Ranciere’s work demonstrates the necessity of staging these 
elements simultaneously, so that the claims of the otherwise invisible share the stage with 
the crumbling of police-order relations which would render them invisible. Interstitial 
resistance is the disruptive force which reveals the former and dismantles the latter. To 
learn democratically appears to mean occupying a space between actions achieved 
through imposed models of consensus and acts of dissensus. Put differently, it means 
sustaining a stage capable of spectacularising moments of dissensus and permitting those 
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acts to collapse the stage that is their support. Secondly, as Derrida demonstrates, there is 
an auto-immunitary tipping point whereby moments of democratic dissensus ossify into 
forms of anti-democratic consensus management. Access to the spectacle of visibility 
thus appears to be synonymous with the social articulation of each participant’s interests, 
manifest as a dissonant rhythm of inclusion and exclusion. Staging democracy through 
participation and co-authorship produced numerous mobile archipolitics, each vying for 
overall control and authorship of the exhibition. The purpose of ‘theatocracy’ is to stage 
this dissensual and anarchic rhythm in perpetuity.  
These conclusions open up three further issues which extend beyond the scope of 
this paper and require further analysis. Firstly, if sustaining disagreement can usefully 
make power visible, what strategies can be usefully employed to help people embrace 
dissensus, rather than consensus, as heuristic mode? Short of the revolutionary overthrow 
of the neoliberal system, such an epistemic shift is difficult to imagine at the macro-level, 
even though it is quite conceivable within the temporary space of interventionist teaching 
strategy. Secondly, how can the deconstructive capacity of ‘theatocratic’ pedagogy be 
sustained, as end in itself, within the audit culture of a neoliberal educational apparatus 
obsessed by ends and metrics? Finally, if radical education must begin from the 
undercommons of the corporate university, must it always end there? Can the 
undercommons usefully infect the structures of these institutions, as entryist virus, if 
limited to time bound ‘project’ formats? Or, must it remain outside the neoliberal 
university, as absolute and irreducible alterity to its commodified, instrumental curricula?  
Finally, we state ‘theatocracy’, as contestation to the ‘police order’ through the 
permanent staging of the democratic paradox, aims for a ‘total redistribution of the 
sensible’ (Rancière 2004). This constitutes democratic education as well as democratic 
politics. If it is possible to think of dissensus-as-learning-as-democracy, it is through the 
optics of otherness opened through the collapsed stage of ‘theatocracy’. Here, the 
scandalous gesture of the undercommons enacts the ‘ignorant one’s lesson’ via learning-
as-democracy; the inclusive recognition of the ‘part who has no part’ in the task of 
translation. In its current usage, inclusion is the reified mantra of self-deluded officials 
and educators, who think they can act in the interest of debt-ridden students calibrated 
according to performance indicators. ‘Theatocracy’ radicalises inclusion as an intention 
that must be grounded in disagreement, indicating the form a democracy to come might 
take.  
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Fig. 4. ‘Messy Democracy’, installation view. 
  
18 
References 
 
Adams R (2017) ‘Proportion of Students Taking Arts Subjects Falls to Lowest Levels in 
Decades’, Guardian, 21st September, [internet] Available 
<https://www.theguardian.com/education/2017/sep/21/proportion-of-students-taking-arts-
subjects-falls-to-lowest-level-in-decade> [Accessed 20/11/18]. 
Althusser L (1971) Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. London: NLB. 
Althusser L, Balibar E, et al (2015 [1965) Reading Capital: The Complete Edition. Trans. 
Ben Brewster, London: Verso. 
Aronowitz S (2008) Against Schooling: Towards an Education That Matters. Boulder, 
Colorado: Paradigm. 
Association of Members of Hornsey College of Art (1969) The Hornsey Affair. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Atkinson T, and Baldwin M (1967) 'Art Teaching', Art-Language, Vol. 1, No. 4, 
November, pp. 25-51. 
Beech D (2008) ‘Include Me Out!’, Art Monthly, 315: April 2008, pp. 1-4.   
Benjamin W (1999) The Arcades Project. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: 
Belknap. 
Benjamin W (1998 [1934]) ‘Author as Producer’, Understanding Brecht. Trans. Anna  
Bostock, London and New York: Verso, pp. 85-104. 
Bey H (2017 [1991]) Taz: The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, 
Poetic Terrorism. 2nd ed., New York: Autonomedia.  
Bowles S and Gintis H (1976) Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and 
the Contradictions of Economic Life. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Bourriaud N (2002 [1998]) Relational Aesthetics. Trans. Simon Pleasance and Fronza 
Woods, Paris: Les presses du réel. 
Bidisha (2015) ‘It’s Time For the Arts World to Look Hard at its Own Racism’, 
Guardian, 19th December [internet] Available 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/dec/19/time-for-art-world-look-own-
racism> [Accessed 20/11/18]. 
Biesta GJJ (2017) Letting Art Teach: Art Education After Joseph Beuys. Arnhem: ArtEZ 
Press. 
Biesta GJJ (2013) The Beautiful Risk of Education. Boulder and London: Paradigm. 
Biesta GJJ (2011) Learning Democracy in School and Society: Education, Lifelong 
Learning and the Politics of Citizenship. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. 
Biesta GJJ (2008) ‘Say You Want a Revolution: Suggestions for the Impossible Future of 
Critical Pedagogy’, Educational Theory, 48, 4, pp. 499-510. 
Biesta GJJ (2006) Beyond Learning: Democratic Education for a Human Future. London 
and New York: Routledge. 
Boltanski L and Chiapello E (2005) The New Spirit of Capitalism. London and New 
York: Verso. 
Bousquet M (2008) How the University Works: Higher Education and the Low-Wage 
Nation. New York: New York University Press. 
Brown W (2015) Undoing the Demos. New York: Zone. 
19 
Charlesworth JJ (2002) ‘Twin Towers: the Spectacular Disappearance of Art and Politics, 
Third Text, 16: 4, pp. 357-66. 
Coughlan S (2018) ‘The Wasted Potential of Mature Students’, BBC News , 14th March 
[internet] Available <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-43388911> [Accessed 
20/11/18]. 
Davis O (2010) Jacques Rancière. Cambridge: Polity. 
Deleuze G and Guattari F (1994) ‘Percept, Affect, Concept’, What is Philosophy, Trans. 
Graham Burchell and Hugh Tomlinson, London: Verso, pp 163-199.  
Deleuze G and Guattari F (1988) ‘Smooth and Striated Space’, A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans. Massumi B, London: Athlone, pp. 474-500. 
Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills (2010) ‘Securing a Sustainable Future 
for Higher Education: An Independent Review of Higher Education Funding and Student 
Finance’, UK Government, 12th October, [internet] Available 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-browne-report-higher-education-
funding-and-student-finance> [Accessed 20/11/18]. 
Derrida J (1997) ‘The Villanova Roundtable: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida’, in 
Deconstruction in a Nutshell, ed. Caputo, New York: Fordham University Press. 
Derrida J (1994) Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, The Work of Mourning and the 
New International. Trans. Peggy Kamuf, New York: Routledge. 
Derrida J (1993) Rogues: Two Essays on Reason. Trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and 
Michael Naas, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Dewey J (2015 [1919]) Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Education. New York: Cosimo Classics. 
Dewey J (1987 [1937]) ‘The Challenge of Democracy to Education’, in Boydston JA 
(ed.) John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925–1953. Carbondale, Illinois and Edwardsville, 
Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, pp. 181–190. 
Earl C (2018) Spaces of Political Pedagogy: Occupy! And other Radical Experiments in 
Adult Learning. London: Routledge. 
Eaton G (2018) ‘Francis Fukuyama interview: Socialism ought to come back’, New 
Statesman America, 17 October [internet] Available 
<https://www.newstatesman.com/culture/observations/2018/10/francis-fukuyama-
interview-socialism-ought-come-back> [Accessed 17/10/18]. 
Edu-Factory Collective (2009) Towards A Global Autonomous University. New York: 
Autonomedia. 
Edu-Factory Collective (2011) ‘University Struggles and the System of Measure’, Edu-
Factory Journal, (1) [internet] Available <http://www.edu-factory.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2011/09/first_issue1.pdf> [Accessed 20/11/18]. 
Ellsworth E (1989) ‘Why Doesn’t This Feel Empowering? Working Through the 
Repressive Myths of Critical Pedagogy’, Harvard Educational Review, 59, 3, August 
1989, pp. 297-324. 
Foster H (2015) Post-Critical?, Bad News Days, London: Verso, pp. 115-124. 
Freire P (1970) Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Trans. Myra Bergman Ramos, New York: 
Seabury. 
Fukuyama F (1992) The End of History and the Last Man. London: Penguin. 
Christopher Fynsk C (2017) ‘Police Actions in Aesthetics: Rancière Reading Deleuze and 
20 
Lyotard on Art’ Qui Parle: Critical Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol. 26, n 1, June 
2017, pp. 61-77. 
Gintis H (1972) ‘Toward a Political Economy of Education: A Radical Critique of Ivan 
Illich ́s Deschooling Society’, Harvard Education Review, vol. 42, n.1, pp. 70-92. 
Giroux HA (1983) Theory and Resistance in Education: A Pedagogy for the Opposition.  
London: Heinemann Educational. 
Greene M (1988) The Dialectic of Freedom. New York and London: Teachers College 
Press. 
Gur Ze’ev I (2010) The Possibility / Impossibility of a New Language in Critical 
Education. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. 
Gur Ze’ev I (1998) ‘Towards a Nonrepressive Critical Pedagogy’, Educational Theory, 
Fall 1998, Vol. 48, pp. 463-486. 
Hallward P (2006) ‘Staging Equality: On Rancière’s Theatocracy’, New Left Review, 37,  
January-February, pp. 109-29. 
Harvey D (2008) The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Horrocks P (2018) ‘The Fall in Part Time Student numbers is a Cause For Concern’. 
Financial Times, March 2nd, [internet] Available <https://www.ft.com/content/267fbaee-
1be7-11e8-956a-43db76e69936> [Accesed 20/11/2018]. 
hooks b (1994) Teaching to Transgress: Education as the Practice of Freedom. New 
York: Routledge. 
Illich I (1971) Deschooling Society. London: Calder and Boyers. 
Lyotard, J-F (1988). The Differend: Phrases in Dispute. Trans. Van Den Abbeele G, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Mahony E (2016) ‘Opening Interstitial Distances in the Neoliberal University and Art 
School’, Performance Research, November 2016, Vol.21(6), p.51-56 
Martin S (2007) ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, Third Text, July 2007, Vol.21, n 4, 
p.369-386. 
McGettigan A (2011) The Great University Gamble: Money, Markets and the Future of 
Higher Education. London: Pluto Press. 
McLaren P (2002 [1989]) Life in Schools: An Introduction to Critical Pedagogy in the 
Foundations of Education. 4th ed, Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
McLaren P (1997) Revolutionary Multiculturalism: Pedagogies of Dissent for the New  
Millenium. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 
Newfield C (2008) Unmaking the Public University: The Forty-Year Assault on the 
Middle Class (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
Rancière J (2014) Proletarian Nights: The Workers Dreams in Nineteenth Century 
France. Trans. John Drury, London and New York: Verso. 
Rancière J (2012) The Intellectual and his People: Staging the People, Vol. 2. Trans. 
David Fernbach, London and New York: Verso. 
Rancière J (2011a) Staging The People: The Proletarian and his Double. Trans. David 
Fernbach, London and New York: Verso. 
Rancière J (2011b) Althusser’s Lesson. Trans. Battista E, London and New York: 
Continuum. 
Rancière J (2010) Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics. Trans. Corcoran S, London and 
New York: Continuum. 
Rancière J (2009a) Aesthetics and its Discontents. Trans. Corcoran S, Cambridge: Polity. 
21 
Rancière J (2009b) The Emancipated Spectator. Trans. Gregory Elliott, London: Verso. 
Rancière J (2004) The Politics of Aesthetics. Trans. Rockhill G, London and New York: 
Continuum. 
Rancière J (2003) The Philosopher and His Poor. Trans. John Drury, Corinne Oster, and 
Andrew Parker, Durham and London: Duke University Press. 
Rancière J (1999) Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy. Trans. Rose J, London and 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Rancière J (1991) The Ignorant Schoolmaster. Trans. Ross K, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
Readings B (1996) The University in Ruins. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: 
Harvard University Press. 
Ritzer G (2007) The McDonaldization of Society 5. London: Sage. 
Rogoff I (2008) ‘Turning’, e-flux. November 2008, 00 [internet] Available <www.e-
flux.com/journal/00/68454/editorial/> [Accessed 25/1/19]. 
Quinn M (2013) Utilitarianism and the Art School in Nineteenth-Century Britain. 
London: Routledge. 
Vaidhyanathan S (2011) The Googlization of Everything, and Why We Should Worry. 
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Washburn J (2005) University, Inc.: The Corporate Corruption of Higher Education. 
New York, Basic Books. 
Williams JJ (2012) ‘Deconstructing Academe: The Birth of Critical University Studies’, 
Chronicle of Higher Education. 2/24/2012, Vol. 58 Issue 25, pp. B7-B8. 
 
